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ABSTRACT In this paper I discuss Stephen Davies’s defence of 
literalism about emotional descriptions of music. According to 
literalism, a piece of music literally possesses the expressive properties 
we attribute to it when we describe it as ‘sad’, ‘happy’, etc. Davies’s 
literalist strategy exploits the concept of polysemy: the meaning of 
emotion words in descriptions of expressive music is related to the 
meaning of those words when used in their primary psychological sense. 
The relation between the two meanings is identified by Davies in 
music’s presentation of emotion-characteristics-in-appearance. I will 
contend that there is a class of polysemous uses of emotion terms in 
descriptions of music that is not included in Davies’s characterization of 
the link between emotions in music and emotions as psychological 
states. I conclude by indicating the consequences of my claim for the 
phenomenology of expressive music. 
 
1 Introduction 
In this paper, I will discuss Stephen Davies’s defence of literalism 
about expressive properties in music. I will start with a brief outline 
of two opposite approaches, the metaphoricist and the literalist. As 
the claims defended by these two accounts are relative to a specific 
class of emotional descriptions of music, it is useful to specify the 
scope of the linguistic expressions in question. These are 
descriptions of music that attribute psychological properties to it, 
particularly properties related to the emotional sphere. Music is 
described as ‘sad’, ‘happy’, ‘despairing’, ‘joyful’, and so on, and these 
adjectives are presumably not meant to indicate the actual 
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possession of emotional states by the music. Although agreement 
about these descriptions is hardly ever complete, all the evidence 
suggests that competent listeners reliably produce similar 
descriptions of the expressive qualities possessed by music. Davies’s 
defence of literalism is centred on the concept of polysemy. 
According to him, the use of emotion words in describing music 
bears a relation to the central use, in which these words denote 
psychological states, but it is not identical with it: emotion words 
refer in the musical case to the presentation of behavioural correlates 
of emotions. The use of emotion words in describing music is 
therefore not metaphorical, but polysemous and literal. I will argue 
that there is a class of polysemous uses of emotion terms in 
describing music that has not been analysed by Davies. I conclude by 
presenting the consequences of my claim for the phenomenology of 
music listening. 
 
2 Metaphoricism vs. Literalism 
Metaphoricists tend to couple the idea that descriptions of 
music as ‘sad’ or ‘happy’ are only metaphorical with a related anti-
realist position concerning the metaphysics of expressive properties. 
For instance, Roger Scruton holds that emotional descriptions of 
music are ineliminable metaphors, and pairs this thesis with the 
claim that expressive properties are not real properties of music.1 
Nick Zangwill holds that emotional descriptions of music are 
metaphors that track the aesthetic properties of music and no other 
property.2 Others, such as R.A. Sharpe, take emotional descriptions of 
music to be the layperson’s way of pointing to musical features.3  
Against metaphoricists, literalists claim that emotion words 
applied to music constitute a case of literal use of language.4 This 
                                                        
1 Scruton 1997, p. 154.  
2 Zangwill 2007, p. 392. 
3 Sharpe 1982, p. 81. 
4 A sophisticated and somewhat unorthodox literalist position is the one held by 
Saam Trivedi (2008). As Davies points out, arousal and expression theories of 
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view is normally paired with a form of aesthetic realism concerning 
expressive properties. In Davies’s case, the linguistic claim is linked 
to a metaphysical claim that construes expressive properties as 
response-dependent properties possessed by the music itself. 
Relative to a certain kind of experiencing subject (human listeners 
with a shared evolved nature), music can be legitimately described as 
possessing expressive properties.   
 
3 The polysemy strategy 
Davies’s literalist account appeals to the concept of polysemy. 
Polysemy is described by linguists as the association of a single 
phonological shape with two or more systematically interrelated 
meanings (e.g. ‘mole’ used to refer to both a small burrowing animal 
and a secret agent working undercover). It is normally contrasted 
with homonymy, which is the association of a phonological shape 
with two or more unrelated meanings (e.g. ‘bank’, which may refer to 
both the riverside and the financial institution). Davies contends that 
emotion words, when used in describing music, are not used to refer 
to emotions as psychological states. Instead, they refer to emotion-
characteristics-in-appearance (henceforth ECA). These are 
behavioural correlates of emotions. Although we learn to recognize 
them from a concurrent actual emotion, to which they give 
expression, their subsequent recognition is independent from the 
occurrence of any actual emotion. We describe an actor’s face and 
posture as sad because we have learnt the sort of faces people pull 
when in the grip of sadness.   
How does Davies explain the shift from actual emotions to 
ECA in the musical case? The polysemy strategy is grounded on a 
specific phenomenology of music listening: it is because we 
experience expressive music as presenting ECA that we may describe 
                                                                                                                         
musical expressiveness also tend to result in a literalist reading of emotional 
descriptions of music. According to these theories, words such as ‘sad’ and ‘happy’, 
when applied to music, refer to emotional states experienced by, respectively, the 
listener and the composer (Davies 2011, pp. 23–24). 
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it with emotion words used in a secondary sense, related to the 
primary psychological one. Because this use is not an idiosyncratic 
use of emotion words in the psychological sense, but rather the use 
of a different polyseme with a related meaning, the main argument 
in favour of a metaphoricist strategy is rejected. This argument relies 
on the apparent impossibility of a literal use of emotion words in the 
description of inanimate entities such as pieces of music. This is 
taken to entail that either we are irrationally attributing 
psychological states to the music, or we are using emotion words 
metaphorically. Against this interpretation, Davies construes the 
expressive qualities we attribute to music as depending on the 
music’s presentation of behavioural correlates of emotions. This 
results in a use of emotion terms that, although related to the 
psychological use, differs from it. The emotion terms may therefore 
be literally applied to music and other inanimate objects (e.g. to a 
weeping willow presenting the typical downcast configuration of a 
body bent by sadness). 
 
4 There is polysemy, and there is polysemy 
The polysemous use of emotion words in music that Davies 
describes is based on our musical experience of ECA. According to 
Davies, music is experienced as resembling typical human emotional 
behaviour, and this is what grounds our use of emotion words in 
describing it. I will call this phenomenological foundation of the 
polysemous use of emotion terms in music the experiential basis of 
such use. Call the sort of polysemous use I just described ECA 
polysemy. My claim is that there is a kind of polysemous use of 
emotion words that is different from ECA polysemy. I call this 
secondary polysemy, with reference to Wittgenstein’s discussion of 
secondary meaning, to which I will briefly refer. I will present three 
examples of secondary polysemy. In these cases, I contend, the 
experiential basis cannot be traced back to the music’s presentation 
of ECA. 
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1) Underdetermined Musical Cues. To illustrate his contour 
theory, Peter Kivy discusses the well-known case of Monteverdi’s 
Lamento di Arianna.5 One might concede that in this case the music 
bears a clear resemblance to the emotional prosody typical of 
sadness and despair. Other instances of expressive music might 
clearly appeal to our spatialized experience of music and recall the 
demeanour of people in the grip of emotions. But consider now the 
elated ascending glissando at the beginning of Gershwin’s Rhapsody 
in Blue. What kind of ECA does this glissando correspond to? Does it 
recall a vocal or a bodily human expression of emotion? Suppose we 
allow for both interpretations. The glissando could be heard as a 
musical presentation of either vocal or bodily behaviour. The trouble 
with this is that allowing ECA to be underdetermined as to their 
sense modality might result in an exceedingly ambiguous 
determination of the emotion expressed by the music. If we interpret 
the glissando as a rise in pitch, we might hear it as a piercing scream 
of pain. As a bodily behaviour, it might recall a body rising up as if 
freed from a burden. To go back to vocal behaviour, the glissando 
might also be considered analogous to the rise in pitch characteristic 
of happy or excited speech prosody. In contrast to the relatively 
determinate character of the emotional descriptions we might offer 
of this musical stimulus, the ECA we might associate with the 
glissando are unable to determine its emotional character, shifting as 
they do from the positive to the negative side of the emotional 
spectrum. These considerations suggest that the source of the 
glissando’s expressiveness is not to be found in its connection with 
the phenomenology of music listening outlined by Davies.  
2) Timbre. ECA have an essential connection with emotions 
as psychological states: they acquire their secondary meaning of 
mere ‘appearances’ when they occur in isolation from those 
psychological states. Timbre, although expressive, often cannot be 
meaningfully interpreted as an ECA. A saturated, dark timbre, rich in 
                                                        
5 Kivy 1980, p. 20. 
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overtones and using a low register, has a menacing character. It is 
natural, for the resemblance theorist, to look at resemblance to the 
speaking voice. Speaking in a raspy, dark voice, and using a low 
register can sound equally threatening. A raspy, dark voice, however, 
is not a behavioural correlate of an emotion: when it occurs in 
humans, it might give rise to what we are saying is a menacing and 
slightly ominous feel, but 1) it does not need to occur when people 
are in fact being menacing, nor does it often occur in these cases; and 
2) it may occur regularly in the expression of other emotions, or 
when we are expressing no emotion at all (as some individuals 
simply happen to have a dark and raspy voice). Its expressive 
character seems independent of its occurrence in human expressive 
behaviour—something that is definitely not true of things such as 
prosodic cues or bodily behaviour. Whereas these assume their 
expressive character through their behavioural association with the 
expression of actual emotions, timbre does not need such an 
association.   
3) The expressive character of harmonic intervals. I believe 
that the distinction between the two cases of emotional polysemy 
lies at the heart of various difficulties faced by resemblance theories 
of musical expressiveness. For instance, Peter Kivy realized from the 
outset that it was problematic for a resemblance-based account such 
as his contour theory to explain cases in which an expressive 
character is attributed to “isolate” musical features, that is, to bits of 
music that do not essentially occur as part of a melodic contour. This 
is a self-inflicted problem for a theory that seeks to explain musical 
expressiveness in terms of features that require a melodic contour or 
movement in tonal space. This problem is particularly evident in 
Kivy’s discussion of major and minor chords, the expressive quality 
of which he explains through conventional association.6 Rather than 
accepting the questionable associationist strategy, one could 
consider the ascription of expressive quality to these musical entities 
as a case of secondary polysemy, in which there is no phenomenal 
                                                        
6 Ibid., p. 77. 
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resemblance between the music and ECA to justify our ascription.7 
Why should we accept this suggestion? In the lack of a plausible 
interpretation of chords and harmonic intervals in terms of ECA, I 
contend that secondary polysemy offers the best candidate for an 
account of the expressive character possessed by these musical 
entities.  
Another example in favour of this strategy is represented by 
the tritone as harmonic interval. We speak of this interval as tense, 
and indeed we often use it to emphasize the yearning quality of the 
music when approaching a resolution. Yet the tritone’s resemblance 
to a tense voice (or to a tense body) is impossible to specify in terms 
of ECA. A tritone does not sound like a tense voice, because, for one 
thing, we can produce no more than one pitched sound at a time 
(unless appropriately trained). Neither could it resemble a tense 
movement, as hearing movement in music requires a succession of 
musical sounds, through which we hear movement in the musical 
space. In conclusion, what the tritone shares with a tense voice is 
nothing but its being tense, or rather, the fact that it seems to be 
aptly described as ‘tense’. 
As anticipated, I believe that secondary polysemy is an 
instance of a sort of secondary use of words that has been described 
by Wittgenstein. Wittgenstein noticed that we talk about mental and 
physical ‘strains’. We do not find the use of the same word in the two 
circumstances puzzling, although we are at a loss when it comes to 
justifying the basis of this linguistic habit.8 What grounds our use of 
                                                        
7 Davies observes, however, that “chords are not merely aggregates of pitched tones” 
(Davies 2011b, p. 102). Rather, chords are perceived in terms of harmonic function. 
The tones of which the chords are composed are part of melodic lines that possess 
their own contour. This line of reply could allow Davies to argue in favour of a 
complete assimilation of the major/minor chords case to his standard explanation 
of musical expressiveness.  
8 “‘But why do you speak both of physical & mental ‘strain’?’—‘Because they have a 
certain similarity, they have a common element.’ What is this common element?’ 
[…] ‘It is a certain tension.’ That doesn't get us any further, for why do you talk of 
tension in these different cases.” (Wittgenstein, Ms 105, 14). 
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the same word in these two cases? Wittgenstein denies that we can 
further specify the resemblance of mental and physical strains, 
except by pointing to the fact that we find the same word 
appropriate to describe both situations.9  
 In connection with these remarks, there is a passage in 
Davies’s most recent defence of his theory of musical expressiveness 
that is worth discussing.  
I think music is expressive in recalling the gait, attitude, 
air, carriage, posture, and comportment of the human 
body, just as someone who is stooped over, dragging, 
faltering, subdued and slow in his or her movements 
cuts a sad figure, so music that is slow, quiet, with heavy 
or thick harmonic bass textures, with underlying 
patterns of unresolved tension, with dark timbres, and a 
recurrently downward impetus sounds sad.10  
Here Davies mentions various “first-order” properties of music that 
make it possible to hear it as expressive. After mentioning melodic 
and rhythmic aspects (which in the passage are paired with 
behavioural correlates of emotions), he goes on to list ‘dark timbres’ 
and ‘unresolved tensions’, using a language that is characteristically 
ambiguous between an interpretation in terms of musical properties 
and one in terms of psychological properties. Music, he says, is 
expressive in recalling behavioural correlates of human emotions. It 
is clear how musical movement might recall the gait, carriage, and 
posture of people in the grip of emotions. Through the movements of 
a melodic line in tonal space, music may resemble, for instance, the 
                                                        
9 Discussing these remarks by Wittgenstein, Michel ter Hark observes: “This does 
not mean that to speak of similarity here is forbidden. If the point is to emphasize a 
difference with word ambiguity where two items are referred to by the same word, 
e.g. ‘bank’, but not in virtue of any similarity, it might be even relevant. The point 
rather is that if the similarity cannot be specified, it cannot be cited as a 
justification of one’s use of words” (ter Hark 2009, p. 600). 
10 Davies 2006, p. 182. 
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figure cut by an individual who is expressing sadness. This is the 
experiential basis for the polysemous use of emotion words 
identified by ECA polysemy. But how do dark timbres and 
unresolved tensions secure the recalling of expressive behaviour? 
Dark and menacing timbres, I have argued, do not receive their 
expressive quality from their behavioural correlation with the 
expression of emotions. Unresolved tensions, as exemplified by the 
case of the tritone, are hard to hear in terms of vocal behaviour. 
Neither can they be interpreted as bodily behaviour, as their tense 
character is in principle independent from any “horizontal” musical 
movement (which seems required for the experience of movement 
in the tonal space).  
 Dark timbres and musical tensions, I contend, relate to 
sombre mood and psychological tension just as physical and mental 
strains relate to each other in the Wittgensteinian case discussed 
above. A view that relates musical properties to human emotion-
characteristics-in-appearance in order to explain their 
expressiveness is bound to leave a number of basic cases 
unexplained, in which music is experienced as possessing expressive 
or psychological properties.  
 
5 ECA polysemy and secondary polysemy: A sketch 
for a general distinction 
I have so far pointed to a number of examples to suggest that 
our use of emotion words and other psychological predicates in 
describing music falls into two different categories: ECA polysemy 
and secondary polysemy. I have not yet proposed, however, a general 
criterion to distinguish the two cases. What is the best way to flesh 
out this distinction? I suppose that this could be done in a number of 
ways, but I wish to focus here on two aspects: justifiability and 
resemblance.  
1) Justifiability. In the domain of emotional description of 
music, secondary polysemy differs from ECA polysemy because of 
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differences in what grounds the use of emotion words in the two 
cases. Whereas ECA polysemy is grounded on Davies’s 
phenomenological analysis of expressive music, according to which 
“we experience music as presenting emotion characteristics in its 
aural appearance”,11 secondary polysemy cannot be justified in the 
same way. That is, although we might be able to specify how a slow 
descending melody can constitute a musical appearance of a body 
bent and slowed down by sadness, we are not able to do so in cases 
such as those mentioned above. It is worth noting, in passing, that 
we might sometimes be able to suggest a causal explanation for cases 
of secondary polysemy. Suppose we discover that a timbre’s capacity 
to suggest a particular mood is related to its particular constitution in 
terms of upper harmonics and its effect on us. This might explain our 
related use of certain emotion words, but does not constitute a 
justification of the use in question.12 Davies correctly identifies the 
experiential basis of ECA polysemy. This use of emotion words is 
based on the musical presentation of emotional-characteristics-in-
appearance. Secondary polysemy, however, has a different 
experiential basis, and is therefore differently grounded. 
2) Resemblance. Another way to describe the experiential 
basis of ECA polysemy is to say that music is experienced as 
resembling human expressive behaviour. This is how we come to 
hear music as presenting ECA, and it is because of this that theories 
of musical expressiveness such as Davies’ have been labelled 
‘resemblance theories’. Secondary polysemy cannot be analysed in 
                                                        
11 Davies 2011, p. 26. 
12 In a German formulation of the remarks discussed above, Wittgenstein considers 
and rejects a possible causal explanation for the use of ‘strain’ in both the physical 
and mental domain: “‘Nun weiß ich auch warum ich das immer “eine Spannung” 
nennen wollte.’ (Ich habe etwa herausgefunden, daß dabei gewisse Muskeln 
gespannt sind. — Aber das wußte ich eben nicht als ich geneigt war es Spannung 
zu nennen.)” (Wittgenstein, Ms150, p. 12) [‘I now know why I always wanted to call 
it “a strain’”. (I have found out that whenever that happens, certain muscles 
become tense.—But this is exactly what I did not know when I was inclined to call 
it a ‘strain’)] (my translation).   
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terms of an experience of resemblance with human expressive 
behaviour. More accurately, we might speak of a ‘resemblance’, or 
‘recalling’, but this will have to be a different sort of resemblance to 
the resemblance in outline and dynamic structure that grounds ECA 
polysemy. This suggests that the distinction between the two cases of 
polysemy could be specified by developing a taxonomy of musical 
resemblance to extra-musical objects that distinguishes between the 
two cases.  
 
6 Consequences for the phenomenology of expressive 
music 
Davies’s polysemy strategy is linked to a particular 
phenomenology of music listening. This phenomenology provides 
the experiential basis on which the polysemous use of emotion terms 
in descriptions of music is grounded. My analysis of the kinds of 
polysemy involved in the relevant emotional descriptions of music 
suggests that there is a class of descriptions that does not acquire its 
polysemous status from the phenomenology outlined by Davies. 
Secondary polysemy undermines the argument according to which 
the literal use of emotion words in describing music is based on their 
reference to ECA. The experiential basis on which secondary 
polysemy is grounded must be of a different sort.  
If all this is correct, I take it that it will not be without 
consequences for an account of the phenomenology of musical 
expressiveness. According to Davies, the expressiveness of music 
depends on its presentation of emotion-characteristics-in-
appearance. He ties his defence of literalism to a phenomenology of 
musical expressiveness that entails a necessary reference to human 
expressive behaviour. I have suggested that a reference to human 
expressive behaviour is not necessary for the experience of 
expressive properties in music. A more liberal account of the 
connection between the use of emotion words in a psychological 
sense and their derivative musical use is therefore paired with a 
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more liberal, thinner phenomenology of music listening. This is, I 
submit, a subject that deserves further investigation.  
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